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Olga Kravets and Özlem Sandıkçı
Marketing for Socialism: 
Soviet Cosmetics in the 1930s 
This article examines the marketing practices of the Soviet 
state trust for cosmetics, TeZhe, in the 1930s. Drawing on 
company records, industry reports, and popular press, we 
show that TeZhe used an array of marketing tactics, which 
were similar to those of the Western manufacturers. However, 
TeZhe’s marketing was aligned with the state’s economic and 
sociocultural initiatives and shaped by the ideological dictates 
of the Soviet system. 
1 The original reads: Na gubakh TeZhe, na shchekakh TeZhe, na broviakh TeZhe, tselovat’ 
gde zhe? 
2 There were three trusts: TeZhe, Lenzhet (Leningrand) and Kharzhet (Kharkov). M. 
Markuze, “Parfi umerno-kosmeticheskoe proizvodstvo SSSR,” Masloboino Zhirovoe Delo 
([Butter Beating Fat Work] hereafter MZhD) 12 (1936): 597–99; “Sovetskaia parfi umerno-
kosmeticheskaia promyshlennost’,” MZhD 11 (1957): 12–17. TeZhe dominated the category 
with over 75 percent for fi ne soaps, more than 76 percent for perfumery, and 91 percent for 
cosmetics in 1927. Otchet o deiatel’nosti tresta TeZhe za 1928–29 (Moscow, 1929), 6; V. Zhit-
omirsky, “Voprosy ratzional’noĭ togrovli,” Sovetskaia Torgolia [Soviet Trade] 31 (1927): 28; 
Polina Zhemchuzhina, “Zadachi parfi umerno-kosmeticheskoĭ promyshlennosti TeZhe,” 
MZhD 6 (1934): 8.
hat is TeZhe?” ask confused readers of Soviet-era poems, songs 
and novels. Today, few even in Russia know what this abbrevia-
tion means. Many (incorrectly) think TeZhe, which sounds French to a 
Russian ear, means tovary dlia zhenshchin (goods for women). There 
was a time, however, when the abbreviation did not require an explana-
tion and was used as a shortcut for all things related to beauty. One 
might recall the once-popular rhyme: On the lips TeZhe/ On the cheeks 
TeZhe/ On the eyebrows TeZhe/ Where can I kiss?1 TeZhe is an abbre-
viation for “Essential Oils Trust” or, in revolutionary language, “Fat 
Trust” (Trest Zhirnost’). In the 1930s, this trust was a state manufac-
turer of cosmetics, including soaps, creams, powders, makeup, and per-
fumes. The trust held a near monopoly position in the industry in the 
Soviet Union and was the largest category producer in Europe.2 Yet, 
surprisingly little is known about this once-successful enterprise. 
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Scholars are showing interest in understanding the efforts of Soviet 
authorities to build a new economic regime. Recent studies have fo-
cused on the emergence of a provisioning system, the so-called “Soviet 
trade.”3 These discuss the institutional, structural, and societal under-
pinnings of Soviet trade and emphasize that underlying the Stalinist 
regime’s approach to consumer-goods production and trade was the 
ideological agenda of disseminating socialist values.4 The existing liter-
ature offers insights into how operations, management, trade tech-
niques, and know-how, as well as entire product categories, were re-
fashioned to endow business with socialist, Soviet-style sensibilities to 
serve the state’s political goals. However, studies do not yet clarify how 
particular Soviet enterprises contributed to the socialist state project. 
In this article, we analyze the Soviet state trust TeZhe and discuss 
how its marketing operations served the state’s political and socio-
cultural agenda.5 We show that TeZhe used various Western marketing 
practices, which were “transplanted onto Soviet ground” explicitly for 
ideological purposes in the 1930s.6 At the operational level, TeZhe’s 
marketing practices were similar to those of the Western hygiene and 
beauty producers, such as Colgate Palmolive, Larkin Company, and Lever 
Brothers.7 However, at the strategic level, TeZhe’s marketing was overtly 
3 Sheila Fitzpatrick, “After NEP: The Fate of NEP Entrepreneurs, Small Traders and Arti-
sans in the Socialist Russia of the 1930s,” Russian History 13 (1986): 187–234; Jukka 
Gronow, Caviar with Champagne: Common Luxury and the Ideals of the Good Life in Sta-
lin’s Russia (New York, 2003); Julie Hessler, A Social History of Soviet Trade: Trade Policy, 
Retail Practices, and Consumption, 1917–1953 (Princeton, 2004); Elena Osokina, Our Daily 
Bread: Socialist Distribution and the Art of Survival in Stalin’s Russia,1927–1941 (New 
York, 2001); Amy E. Randall, The Soviet Dream World of Retail Trade and Consumption in 
the 1930s (New York, 2008).
4 Randall, Soviet Dream, 11. 
5 Leon Trotsky notes that state trusts dominated industry in the 1920–1930s in the The 
Revolution Betrayed (Mineola, N.Y., 2004; trans. Max Eastman), 36. 
6 V. Kantorovich, “Novye Formy Roznichnoĭ Torgovli,” Sovetskaia Torgolia 9 (1928): 5–
7. Broadly, Western marketing sensibility refers to serving customer needs profi tably. A fi rm 
devises a marketing program that synergistically integrates product development, promo-
tion, pricing, and distribution. See Philip Kotler and Gary Armstrong, Principles of Market-
ing (Upper Saddle River, N.J., 2009, 13th ed.). In the 1930s, Soviet authorities borrowed 
technology and marketing techniques from the West. Anastas Mikoyan, “Dva mesiatsa v 
SshA,” Ekonmika, Politica, Ideologiia [Economy, Politics, Ideology] 10 (1971): 68; Polina 
Zhemchuzhina, “V tiskhakh depressii,” MZhD 6 (1936): 265–72. Trade journals published 
original articles and reprints of Western press on merchandising, pricing, promotion, packag-
ing, and customer service. From 1933 to 1937 the journal Organizatsia i Tekhnika Sovetskoi 
Torgovli [Organization and Techniques of Soviet Trade] (hereafter OTST) had a “foreign 
trade techniques” section, with articles on “inventory control in the US” and “colored packag-
ing”: 1 (1933): 35–47, and “store layout” and “mobile trade”: 1 (1935): 19–75.
7 See David Foster, The Story of Colgate-Palmolive (New York, 1975); Geoffrey Jones, 
Beauty Imagined: A History of the Global Beauty Industry (Oxford, 2010); Juliann Sivulka, 
Stronger than Dirt: A Cultural History of Advertising Personal Hygiene in America, 1875–
1940 (New York, 2001); Howard R. Stanger, “From Factory to Family: The Creation of a Cor-
porate Culture in the Larkin Company Buffalo, New York,” Business History Review 74 
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and directly aligned with the state’s sociocultural and economic ini-
tiatives and shaped by the ideological dictates of the Soviet system. 
Through its rich product assortment, didactic promotional texts, differ-
entiated prices and showcase retail sites, TeZhe played its role in pro-
moting Soviet policies, mobilizing the body for the Soviet regime, and 
constructing a vision of an ideal Soviet citizen. 
Our study examines the historic context of ideological marketing 
practices of a Soviet state trust. In the West, beyond stimulating con-
sumer demand and fending off competition, marketing propagates cer-
tain ideas, ideals, and values about gender, family, personhood, national-
ity, and citizenship.8 In order to maximize sales by stimulating consumer 
desire, Western businesses go beyond product attributes and bestow 
their goods with certain cultural and political meanings and associa-
tions.9 Our study of TeZhe reveals that in the Soviet case, precisely be-
cause of such ideological potential, the state intentionally and instru-
mentally employed marketing to advance socialist policies. Western 
businesses drew on ideological sensibilities to expand demand and en-
sure continuous profi t, whereas in the Soviet case ideology was essen-
tially and explicitly implicated in the marketing practices of state trusts. 
Thus, while the trust’s marketing practices appeared similar to those of 
its Western counterparts, the state shaped and thwarted their under-
pinning logic; hence TeZhe’s practices were qualitatively different. In 
the case of TeZhe, the ways marketing unfolds hinge upon the specifi c 
historical context. At a broader level, by illuminating the distinctive fea-
tures of marketing in the Soviet context, our study contributes to scholar-
ship on marketing history in non-Western, noncapitalist economies.10 
To examine TeZhe’s operations in the Soviet socio-historical con-
text of the 1930s, we draw upon company reports, industry instructions 
and publications, articles in popular press, and advertisements. These 
sources provide a comprehensive picture of marketing practices that the 
producers conceived, framed, and presented. We recommend further 
studies to investigate if and how targeted consumers responded to mar-
keting. What follows is a brief overview of the political and economic 
(2000): 407–33. On French perfume manufacturers’ marketing, see Eugénie Briot, “From 
Industry to Luxury: French Perfume in the Nineteenth Century,” Business History Review 
85 (Summer 2011): 273–94. 
8 Charles F. McGovern, Sold American: Consumption and Citizenship, 1890–1945 (Cha-
pel Hill, 2006); Roland Marchand, Advertising the American Dream (Berkeley, 1985).
9 Stuart Ewen, Captains of Consciousness: Advertising and the Social Roots of the Con-
sumer Culture (New York, 1976). For a nineteenth-century British example of this process, 
see Charles Harvey, Jon Press, and Mairi Maclean, “William Morris, Cultural Leadership, 
and the Dynamics of Taste,” Business History Review 85 (Summer 2011): 245–71. 
10 Roy Church, “New Perspectives on the History of Products, Firms, Marketing, and Con-
sumers in Britain and the United States since the Mid-Nineteenth Century,” Economic His-
tory Review 52 (1999): 405.
Olga Kravets and Özlem Sandıkçı / 464
background that led to the emergence of state trusts. We then discuss 
TeZhe’s history, production, and marketing efforts. The article con-
cludes with the implications of our study. 
Political and Economic Background
Late-nineteenth-century Russia participated in a consumer revolu-
tion commonly associated with the West.11 A variety of new consumer 
goods became available to urbanites, and advertisements fi lled city 
streets and newspapers.12 In the thriving soap-and-perfume industry in 
Russia, two key players were A. Rallet & Co. and Brocard & Co.13 Estab-
lished in 1843 by the Frenchman Alphonse Rallet, A. Rallet & Co. spe-
cialized in perfume, powder, and fi ne soap, offering 675 products to 
Russian consumers in 1910.14 Another Frenchman, Henry Brocard, es-
tablished the largest soap-maker in Europe, Brocard & Co., in 1864. It 
specialized in cheap soap and started producing perfumes in the 1900s. 
Both fi rms employed foreign specialists, featured state-of-the-art tech-
nology, and distributed products throughout Imperial Russia, the Bal-
kans, Turkey, and China.15
World War I, the Bolshevik Revolution, and the Civil War (1914–
1922) interrupted economic development in Russia. Viewing the mar-
ket as incongruent with socialist ideals, Bolsheviks nationalized major 
manufacturers and set up a direct distribution system.16 Yet these poli-
cies failed to improve the economy. In 1921, to deal with chronic prod-
uct shortages, the government introduced the New Economic Policy 
(NEP), which temporarily legalized the market and small private enter-
prises.17 The hardcore Bolsheviks perceived NEP as a betrayal of com-
munist ideals. In 1928, Stalin ended NEP and introduced the First 
Five-Year Plan, which marked heavy industry as the route for economic 
development. While industrial output increased signifi cantly, much of 
the population remained impoverished and without basic goods.18 
11 Raymond Williams, Dream Worlds (Berkeley, 1982); McGovern, Sold American.
12 Sally West, “The Material Promised Land: Advertising’s Modern Agenda in Late Impe-
rial Russia,” Russian Review 57 (1998): 345–63.
13 V. Blizniak et al., Parfi umerno-kosmeticheskaia Promyshlennost’ (Moscow, 1958), 77–
78; Iu. Stasenkov, Moskovskaia Parifumernaia Fabrika (Moscow, 1957), 3–7; A. Zvezdov 
and A. Mishel, Novaia Zaria (Moscow, 1924), 3–8; N. Vasil’eva, 100 let Parfi umernoĭ Fab-
rike (Moscow, 1965), 7–11.
14 I. Aratov, “Fabrika ‘Svoboda’ za 40 let Sovetskoĭ Vlasti,” MZhD 11 (1957): 45.
15 Anna Barulina, “Novaia Zaria,” 2006, 11–15: http://www.novzar.ru/; Blizniak et al., 
Parfi umerno-kosmeticheskaya Promyshlennost’; Vasil’eva, 100 let Parfi umernoĭ Fabrike. 
16 Nikolai Bukharin and Evgeny Preobrazhensky, The ABC of Communism (Baltimore, 
1969; 1st ed. 1922); Hessler, Social History, 24. 
17 Hessler, Social History. 
18 S. G. Wheatcroft, R. W. Davis, and J. M. Cooper, “Soviet Industrialization Reconsidered: 
Some Preliminary Conclusions about Economic Development between 1926–1941,” Economic 
History Review 39 (1986): 264–94; Fitzpatrick, “After NEP”; Osokina, Our Daily Bread.
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Partly due to worsening living conditions in the late 1920s, the re-
gime faced a threat of civil unrest. Popular discontent was a sign that 
the masses did not internalize socialist ideals. As a solution, offi cials 
rearticulated socialism as “prosperity for all.” Stalin declared: “A char-
acteristic feature of our revolution consists in the fact that it gave the 
people not only freedom but also material benefi ts and the opportunity 
for a rich and cultured life.”19 Stalin’s dictum “for a prosperous life” 
suggested that there would be more goods available. Hence, the 1932 
Second Five-Year Plan called for focus on consumer goods and led to the 
establishment of the Soviet provisioning system, called “Soviet trade.”20
The ideological campaign of kul’turnost’ (culturedness) accompa-
nied the economic plan. Kul’turnost’ aimed to educate and indoctrinate 
people in socialist values.21 Essentially, kul’turnost’ was a Soviet ver-
sion of “civilizing projects” that defi ned the interwar Zeitgeist and were 
instrumental in constructing modern citizens.22 European governments 
saw a clean, healthy population as both economic and military strategic 
resources. Hence, state intervention into population control and care 
was a common practice.23 The Soviet state emphasized body hygiene, 
physical aptitude, and culturedness. Culturedness involved literacy, 
proper manners, appropriate attire, appreciation of the arts, and knowl-
edge of Communist ideology.24 
Women were the primary target of kul’turnost.’ First, women his-
torically represented the epitome of backwardness: “illiterate, unskilled, 
socio-culturally regressive, stuck in the petty concerns of domesticity, 
and politically disengaged.”25 Also, women most vigorously resisted the 
1929–1930 collectivization of privately owned agricultural resources, as 
evinced by the women’s uprisings (Bab’i Bunty).26 Hence, for Soviet au-
thorities, women stood for backward masses who failed to appreciate the 
socialist values of equality and a better life for all. Second, given their 
reproductive capability, women were “producers” of “fresh members of 
19 Quoted in Gronow, Caviar with Champagne, 138; Sheila Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalin-
ism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times (New York, 1999); Randall, Soviet Dream. 
20 Gronow, Caviar with Champagne, 119–44; Hessler, Social History, 197–247; Randall, 
Soviet Dream, 137–79.
21 On kul’turnost’, Vadim Volkov, “The Concept of Kul’turnost’: Notes on the Stalinist Civ-
ilizing Process,” in Stalinism: New Directions, ed. Sheila Fitzpatrick (New York, 1999), 
210–30.
22 Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners (Oxford, 1978; trans. 
Edmund Jephcott); for Soviet context, see Oleg Kharkhordin, The Collective and the Individ-
ual in Russia (London, 1999).
23 David Hoffmann, Stalinist Values: The Cultural Norms of Soviet Modernity, 1917–1941 
(Ithaca, 2003), 17.
24 Ibid.; Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism, 79–80. 
25 M. Butuzova, Kooperirovanie Trudiaschikhsia Zhenschin (Moscow, 1927). 
26 Viola Lynne, Peasant Rebels under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant 
Resistance (Oxford, 1996).
Olga Kravets and Özlem Sandıkçı / 466
the Soviet republic.”27 As in many European countries, the Soviet Union 
experienced a signifi cant decrease in population due to wars and eco-
nomic hardship.28 European governments introduced policies endors-
ing family values and motherhood, offered incentives for childbirth, 
and established childcare. The emphasis on the woman’s role in educat-
ing children in socialist values distinguished Soviet pronatal policies. 
To play this role, women were to be modernized fi rst. According to offi -
cials, a modern Soviet woman was to engage in productive labor, exer-
cise physical and moral purity, organize her household according to ra-
tional principles, and craft a pleasant appearance.29 
In the 1930s, the kul’turnost’ campaign introduced a special cate-
gory of cultured goods, kul’t tovary, which included stationery, hygiene 
products, watches, and radios. Some policy makers believed that goods 
were “the best concrete political and cultural propagandists” and “effec-
tive agitators” because they could penetrate provinces and “speak” to the 
“backward” populations, infusing them with progressive sensibilities.30 
The state ran advertising campaigns and set up a distribution network 
that promoted cultured goods to outlying provinces.31 At the time, this 
culturedness-through-consumption initiative included even cosmetics.32 
Thus, TeZhe came to play a role in civilizing people, articulating social-
ist sensibilities, and communicating the vision of Soviet prosperity. 
TeZhe’s History
The Soviet government established TeZhe in 1921 through the na-
tionalization of cosmetics manufacturers, including A. Rallet & Co. and 
Brocard & Co. By the 1930s, TeZhe was a near-monopoly in the beauty 
industry, comprised of diverse production facilities, chemical labora-
tories, and a printing house.33 TeZhe was charged with the task of 
27 Pavla Vesela, “The Hardening of Cement: Russian Women and Modernization,” NWSA 
Journal 15 (Fall 2003): 118.
28 Hoffmann, Stalinist Values.
29 Susan Reid, “All Stalin’s Women: Gender and Power in Soviet Art of the 1930s,” Slavic 
Review 1 (Spring 1998): 133–73; Pat Simpson, “Parading Myths: Imaging New Soviet Woman 
on Fizkul’turnik’s Day, July 1944,” Russian Review 63 (Apr. 2004): 187–211.
30 Il’in-Landsky, “Neobkhodimost’ organizovat’ posyltorg,” Sovetskaia Torgovlia 52 
(1928): 21–22; this is consistent with the 1920s Russian Constructivists’ conception of ob-
jects as comrades. See Christina Kiaer, Imagine No Possessions: The Socialist Objects of 
Russian Constructivism (Cambridge, Mass., 2005), 2–87.
31 Hessler, Social History; Randall, Soviet Dream.
32 In the 1930s, several consumer-goods trusts partook in Soviet civilizing efforts. Mos-
cow Miasokombinat (meat-products trust) promoted modern canned and readymade meat 
products. Confectionary enterprises such as Krasnyi Oktiabr’ and Rot Front advertised the 
bounties of the Soviet life. Gronow, Caviar with Champagne; Aleksandr Snopkov, ed., Ad-
vertising Art in Russia (Moscow, 2007). 
33 Blizniak et al., Parfi umerno-kosmeticheskaia Promyshlennost’, 77–78. 
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i mproving the population’s hygiene and initially focused on mass pro-
duction of basic soap. Once-innovative and thriving factories were 
churning out mediocre products.34 However, in early 1930s, TeZhe’s 
fate was temporarily reversed. Tasked with promoting the Stalinist ide-
ological agenda, TeZhe transformed into a Soviet enterprise that could 
rival its foreign counterparts both in production capacity and market-
ing prowess. 
Polina Zhemchuzhina (a revolutionary pseudonym) played a prom-
inent role in TeZhe’s transformation. Born Perl Karpovskaia to a Jewish 
family in Ekaterinoslav, she became a Party member in 1918 and served 
as a propaganda commissar in the Red Army during the Civil War.35 
She made a career in the Soviet hierarchy, becoming Minister of Fish-
ing Industry in 1939, but, charged with treason in 1948, she was sent to 
a labor camp.36 In the 1930s, however, her career was at its peak: as a 
director of Novaia Zaria, a TeZhe factory in 1930, she was quickly pro-
moted to manage the TeZhe trust in 1932.37 Her basic education from 
the Moscow Institute of Economics (1925–1926) and experience as a 
Red Army propaganda worker served her well. A capable organizer and 
a Party activist, Zhemchuzhina was appointed to oversee the modern-
ization of the beauty industry. She traveled around Russia and overseas 
to create an enterprise that could make cosmetics for ordinary citizens. 
The Soviet state recognized her efforts, and in 1937 she became the 
head of Glavperfum (offi ce for perfumery).38 
Zhemchuzhina belonged to Stalin’s inner circle. Married to the 
head of the government, Vyacheslav Molotov, she was once considered 
the fi rst lady of the Soviet Union and hosted lavish state parties at the 
Kremlin.39 Zhemchuzhina leveraged her position to develop TeZhe. In 
his memoirs, Anastas Mikoyan, Minister of Food Industry, remembers 
the episode when Stalin asked him to “look after” TeZhe, then under 
34 Ibid.; Stasenkov, Moskovskaia Parfi umernaia Fabrika, 3–7; Dubnov, “Obrazets 
Bolshevistskoĭ Bor’by za Plan,” MZhD 4 (1934): 46. 
35 Larisa Vasil’eva, Kremlin Wives (New York, 1994; trans. Cathy Porter), 136–60; Miklos 
Kun, Stalin: An Unknown Portrait (Budapest, 2003), 270–81.
36 Polina Zhemchuzhina was fi rst accused of spying against the Soviet state in 1939. After 
the Politburo heard her case, the allegations against her were deemed slanderous. However, 
in 1948, facing similar accusations, she was imprisoned. The treason accusation seemed to 
stem from her support of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee during World War II and her 
friendship with Golda Meir, the fi rst Israeli ambassador to the USSR after the establishment 
of the state of Israel in 1948 (Vasil’eva, Kremlin Wives; Kun, Stalin). 
37 Vasil’eva, 100 let Parfi umernoĭ Fabrike, 19.
38 Given that there was an overall political support for the consumer goods, which was 
withdrawn as the threat of war approached, Zhemchuzhina’s specifi c contribution to the rise 
of TeZhe is diffi cult to ascertain. However, TeZhe’s public relations materials convincingly 
show that Zhemchuzhina championed TeZhe’s development. 
39 Kun, Stalin.
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the control of the Narkomat (Ministry) of Consumer Goods. Stalin re-
ferred to his conversation with Zhemchuzhina: 
She complained about the lack of attention to a “perspective, profi t-
able and necessary for people” industry, saying that they had facto-
ries to produce soaps, makeup and perfumes. But manufacturing to 
full capacity was impossible because Narkomat did not supply fats. 
They lacked oils, packaging and other materials to make goods im-
portant for people. Particularly, women had a great need. The trust 
had capacity unutilized due to shortages. Stalin concluded that he 
decided to transfer perfumery to the care of my Narkomat.40 
Thus, cosmetics became a subdivision within the Narkomat of the Food 
Industry. As Zhemchuzhina noted, this transfer streamlined TeZhe’s 
management structure. No longer subordinate to various planning com-
mittees, she reported directly to the Narkomat.41 Furthermore, TeZhe 
was permitted to search for source materials and distribute its products 
independently, upon completing the state-mandated plans.42 
TeZhe’s Production and Operations
Zhemchuzhina’s personal connections and organizational skills 
helped develop TeZhe’s manufacturing potential. Importantly, there was 
a political will to encourage the production of body-care goods. Still, 
these factors alone were not enough to marshal the necessary resources. 
Both workers and consumers had to be mobilized. To sustain the ideal 
of a workers’ state, any imperative needed to appear supported by work-
ers. In the context of the wide-scale impoverishment of the population, 
it was also critical that TeZhe convince people of the necessity to manu-
facture and consume these (until recently) non-essential goods.43 Let-
ters to Stalin were often used to represent workers’ voices and served as 
evidence for consumer demand.44 In the case of TeZhe, a letter from 
village women in the Caucasus was used to justify the new emphasis on 
40 Anastas Mikoyan, Tak Bylo (Moscow, 1999), 298. 
41 Polina Zhemchuzhina, “Vypolnim Sotsialisticheskiĭ Zakaz,” MZhD 1 (1934): 11–12.
42 Historians report that Soviet enterprises had some discretion in operational plans 
within the Soviet command system; see Paul Gregory and Mark Harrison, “Allocation under 
Dictatorship: Research in Stalin’s Archives,” Journal of Economic Literature 43 (2005): 
721–76.
43 For example, in 1927 the rubric “V Chem Krasota” in Rabotnitsa [worker woman] re-
peatedly stated that beauty as purveyed by TeZhe was artifi cial and unnecessary (e.g., no. 26 
[1927]: 13); also Olga Gurova, “Ideology of Consumption in Soviet Union: From Asceticism to 
the Legitimating of Consumer Goods,” Anthropology of East Europe Review 24 (2006): 
91–98. 
44 For a discussion of letters as a medium between rulers and the public, see Andrei Soko-
lov, Golos Naroda (Moscow, 1998).
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cosmetics: “Our village consumes more soap now than before. We want 
to live in cleanliness and culturally. Let our factories produce more 
quality soap, in particular, fragrant soap.”45 
A shrewd politician-administrator, Zhemchuzhina used the Cauca-
sus women’s letter to secure workers’ and Party leaders’ cooperation. At 
the 1934 TeZhe Conference of High-Achieving Workers, with two min-
isters (Mikhail Kalinin and Anastas Mikoyan) in attendance, Zhemchu-
zhina referred to the letter, emphasizing that the demand for cosmetics 
came from the “working masses” and arose from their growing prosper-
ity and cultural awareness. In turn, the ministers stressed the workers’ 
responsibility to address the villagers’ demand. Asking workers to treat 
the letter as a “Party and people’s order,” they requested that TeZhe in-
crease its efforts to meet people’s “cultural needs.”46 
With such a mandate, TeZhe began industrializing its manufactur-
ing and expanding its resource base. Throughout the 1930s, TeZhe de-
veloped plantations of oil-rich plants and lobbied for investment in 
their cultivation. Soviet scientists identifi ed local equivalents to French 
aromatic varieties.47 During this period, the variety of oils produced lo-
cally grew steadily, yet the output volumes were not suffi cient to pro-
vide fi ne soap for every Soviet household. Thus, TeZhe also carried out 
research into chemical synthesis to produce oils. Synthetic oils made 
perfume manufacturing cheaper and quicker, facilitating a rapid and 
substantial increase in production.48 However, TeZhe still lacked ade-
quate supplies and had to import raw materials; to accommodate pro-
duction growth, imports increased from 6,100 tons in 1934 to 121,000 
tons in 1937 (see Table 1).49 
Furthermore, lack of adequate equipment and technology hin-
dered TeZhe’s manufacturing. The existing equipment was unable to 
deliver the volumes that the plan required, so TeZhe needed to overhaul 
the machinery infrastructure.50 The trust tackled the task in three 
ways: broad-scale mechanization by introducing conveyers and semi-
automated machinery; auxiliary facilities, such as glass, wood and 
paper processing factories; and in-house units (Transmissia) for upgrad-
ing and building industrial-capacity equipment.51 Still, TeZhe lagged 
45 “Strana Trebuet Mylo–Dadim Mylo,” Rabotnitsa 33 (1933): 6–9.
46 Zhemchuzhina fi rst referred to the letter as “a socialist order” in TeZhe’s 1933 report 
(Zhemchuzhina, “Vypolnim sotsialisticheskiĭ zakaz,” 12); at the 1934 Conference, the func-
tionaries appeared to ratify such framing. “Slet Udarnikov TeZhe,” MZhD 1 (1935): 50–53.
47 F. Kandiba, “Industriia Tsvetov,” Ogonek 30 (1936): 20–21.
48 Blizniak et al., Parfi umerno-kosmeticheskaia Promyshlennost’, 94–99. 
49 Ibid.; Zhemchuzhina, “Zadachi Parfi umernoĭ Promyshlennosti.”
50 S. Vaĭnshteĭn, “Parfi umerno-kosmeticheskaia Promyshlennost’ k XX Velikoĭ Revolut-
sii,” MZhD 5 (1937): 29–30.
51 “Sovetskaia Parfi umerno-kosmeticheskaia Promyshlennost’,” 15.
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technologically. In 1935, Zhemchuzhina went on goodwill trips to the 
US and Europe to acquire machinery and know-how. She visited lead-
ing manufacturers, such as Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co.52 Although 
Zhemchuzhina did not mention if any equipment was purchased during 
the trip, the 1937 industry report stated that a signifi cant number of 
foreign machines had been installed throughout TeZhe factories.53 
In the mid-1930s, despite limitations, the Soviet cosmetics indus-
try grew signifi cantly. TeZhe dominated with shares from 75 percent to 
100 percent across product lines, and its manufacturing focus shifted 
from only basic soap to perfume, creams, and makeup (see Table 2). 54 
Overall, TeZhe blended old and new, foreign and local equipment, 
know-how, and techniques. By the mid-1930s, TeZhe was an industrial 
conglomerate, dominating the industry at home in the Soviet Union 
and exporting its goods across Europe. However, TeZhe was not just a 
manufacturing but also a marketing giant. 
TeZhe’s Marketing
In the 1930s, TeZhe experienced growth in product volume and 
variety. In 1933, its Svoboda factory produced six fi ne soaps, which 
Table 1 
Dynamics of Oil-Rich Plants Output (in tons)
Oils 1932 1937 1940
Anise  1.0   0.7  12.9
Basil —   0.2  12.3
Geranium  2.8  21.7  46.8
Coriander 78.5 233.0 333.0
Lavender  0.7  12.5  14.5
Mint  1.1 129.8 181.4
Rose —   0.21   0.27
Rennel  0.67  48.4   6.9
Sage  4.1   9.8  24.6
 Total 93.0 471.0 646.0
Source: V. Blizniak et al., Parfi umerno-kosmeticheskaia Promishlennost’ (Moscow, 1958), 
100–106.
52 Zhemchuzhina, “V Tiskakh Depressii”; Polina Zhemchuzhina, “Dadim Strane Bol’she 
Parfi umerii,” MZhD 12 (1936): 563.
53 I. Shneerson, “Itogi i Perspectivy,” MZhD 5 (1938): 35; F. Kursky, “V Bor’be za 
Kachestvo Tualetnogo Myla,” MZhD 3 (1937): 22.
54 See footnote 2; Vaĭnshteĭn, “Parfi umerno-kosmeticheskaia Promyshlennost’.”
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i ncreased to one hundred in 1934, and its Novaia Zaria factory intro-
duced fi fteen perfumes, ten colognes, and eleven powders in 1935 
alone. Overall, in 1935, TeZhe produced fi fty-fi ve colognes and fi fty-
two perfumes.55 Two key reasons underpinned this pursuit of product 
variety. First, ideologically, the richness of assortment was equated 
with abundance. As sociologist Jukka Gronow documents, the empha-
sis on product diversity was characteristic of all consumer-goods in-
dustries and was intended to refl ect the emergent Soviet prosperity.56 
In TeZhe’s 1935 report, Zhemchuzhina stressed the importance of as-
sortment for “the development of the cultured life in a classless society, 
as per party order.” She further noted that TeZhe’s product assortment 
still “lagged behind the country’s rising wealth and did not meet the 
needs for prosperous Soviet living.”57 Second, TeZhe had to establish 
cosmetics as a scientifi c progressive industry, concerned with public 
health. 
Table 2
Perfumery and Cosmetic Products Output (in million items)
Items 1928 1932 1934 1936 1938 1940
Perfume 10.34 10.55 10.61 18.06 24.26 34.02
Cologne  6.23 16.02 31.12 47.84 65.71 88.19
Eau de perfume  0.60  2.27  4.95  2.22  4.98  1.49
Surprise boxesa  0.03  0.28  0.61  0.67  0.56  0.16
Tooth powder 17.30 25.08 39.08 62.82 65.55 74.78
Toothpaste  4.19  0.15  0.14  8.46 14.79 14.45
Powder 33.74 27.40 59.55 67.95 54.13 47.14
Cream in tube, glass box,
 and metal box 18.19 14.94 23.07 43.25 62.94 40.00
Petroleum jelly in 
 metal box and tube 17.15 51.79 69.65 60.76 74.76 36.50
Lipstick  0.08  0.94  2.92 b b  5.34
Fine liquid soaps  0.09  2.15  2.54  3.59  7.89  5.51
Washing powder  4.84 27.02 28.59 19.73 20.07  8.88
a Combination packs e.g., perfume, powder, and soap. 
b No data available.
Source: V. Blizniak et al., Parfi umerno-kosmeticheskaia Promishlennost’ (Moscow, 1958), 
82, 164–65.
55 Polina Zhemchuzhina, “Parfi umerno-kosmeticheskaia Promyshlennost’ Soiuza SSR i 
Zapadnoĭ Evropy,” MZhD 9 (1935): 391.
56 Gronow, Caviar with Champagne, 43–66.
57 Zhemchuzhina, “Parfi umerno-kosmeticheskaia Promyshlennost’ Soiuza SSR i Zapadnoĭ 
Evropy,” 392.
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Such legitimization was necessary given cosmetics’ historical asso-
ciation with bourgeois values.58 In the annual agenda, Zhemchuzhina 
declared: 
All products must be science-based: every product (cream, soaps, 
lipstick) must have a hygienic function. All existing recipes must be 
improved by developing new medicinal components so that prod-
ucts carry health benefi ts. We must involve hygienists and derma-
tologists in product development.59 
Accordingly, TeZhe engaged in an extensive research program to aug-
ment the products’ medicinal properties. For example, attempts were 
made to “vitamize” tooth powders and elixirs by adding vitamin C and 
body creams by adding pro-vitamin A and Beta-carotene.60 
TeZhe achieved the growth of product variety in several ways. First, 
the trust revived prerevolutionary recipes, with many newly reintro-
duced products now streamlined for mass production. “Red Moscow” 
(Krasnaia Moskva), perhaps the best-known Soviet perfume, is one ex-
ample. Although among the fi rst fragrances produced after the Revolu-
tion, it was not a Soviet creation. Red Moscow is believed to be just a 
Soviet name for Le Bouquet Préféré de l’Impératrice fragrance, devel-
oped in 1913 by Brocard & Co.61 The former Brocard’s perfumer Au-
guste Michel, then working in Novaia Zaria, recomposed it using syn-
thetic essences and local substitutes for foreign oils.62 When transformed 
into a Soviet scent, a pattern replicating the edges of the Kremlin fort 
replaced the fl owers on its package. 
Indeed, packaging was the second way of making Soviet cosmetics. 
TeZhe created new varieties by putting the same item into different 
packages or repackaging old products. Here, packaging gained particu-
lar importance. The petit-bourgeois nymphs and pastoral scenes of Art 
Nouveau were replaced with revolutionary avant-garde themes, and 
then with cultured Art Deco images. TeZhe commissioned renowned 
artists to design bottles and labels, including Sergey Chekhonin, Alex-
ander Deĭneka, and Alexander Rodchenko.63 TeZhe also recruited for-
eign specialists; in 1935, Zhemchuzhina invited Hungarian designer 
58 Gurova, “Ideology of Consumption.” The beauty industry faced a similar legitimization 
challenge in the West, albeit for different reasons; see Jones, Beauty Imagined. 
59 Zhemchuzhina, “Zadachi Parfi umerno-kosmeticheskoĭ Promyshlennosti,” 8.
60 A. Naimark, “Vitamizatsiia Kosmeticheskoĭ Promyshlennosti,” MZhD 5 (1937): 30–31.
61 Barulina, “Novaia Zaria.”
62 In the 1920s, Auguste Michel, the French specialist, worked in Novaia Zaria and 
trained Soviet perfumers there; his fate after the 1930s is unknown. Vasil’eva, 100 let 
parfi umernoĭ fabrike, 20–23.
63 Kiaer, Imagine No Possessions, 143–96; Snopkov, ed. Advertising Art in Russia, 5 and 
145.
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Eva Stricker Zeisel to serve as the artistic director of the glass factory.64 
The artists took their commissions seriously. The Association of Revo-
lutionary Artists instructed that package artwork should be a part of the 
cultural revolution because images on everyday products could pene-
trate deeply into people’s minds. Hence, package design should be 
about transmitting an ideological message, rather than communicating 
the package’s contents.65 
An experienced propagandist, Zhemchuzhina knew the importance 
of image creation. In industry publications, she emphasized that prod-
ucts must have a “cultured appearance” (kul’turniĭ vid ). At the 1934 
TeZhe Conference of High-Achieving Workers, she demanded that 
every TeZhe product be an exemplar of “cultured work”: It should in-
clude aesthetic presentation and an ideological message.66 That same 
year, Zhemchuzhina lobbied to reconstruct a crystal factory to produce 
refi ned bottles and ordered a wider use of color on carton and metal 
boxes.67 This emphasis on packaging was a change for TeZhe, which 
until the 1930s sold up to 80 percent of its soap unpackaged.68 The 
“cultured work” was to motivate Soviet citizens to take “correct and ra-
tional care of their bodies.”69 In a 1936 article, Zhemchuzhina explained, 
“Similar to children who were more willing to wash with colored and 
shaped soaps, adults would be more likely to use nicely packaged hy-
giene products.”70 
In 1930s Soviet marketing, packages were not “silent salesmen” but 
propaganda activists.71 Their purpose was not to seduce consumers 
but educate them about hygiene and instill Soviet sensibilities.72 At 
the time, “hygiene—to the masses!” was a popular slogan carried into 
homes with every soap bar and echoed the Western “brightening the 
dark corners of the earth” project.73 In the Soviet case, packages liter-
ally carried propaganda from the public into the private sphere. Eager 
64 “Eva Stricker Zeisel—Life Chronology” at www.evazeisel.org.
65 Zemenkov, Grafi ka v bytu (Moscow, 1930).
66 “Slet Udarnikov TeZhe.”
67 Zhemchuzhina, “Zadachi Parfi umerno-kosmeticheskoĭ Promyshlennosti.” 
68 Otchet o deiatel’nosti tresta TeZhe za 1928–29. 
69 “Slet Udarnikov TeZhe,” 51; Vaĭnshteĭn, “Parfi umerno-kosmeticheskaia Promyshlen-
nost’,” 29. The Soviet emphasis on design contrasts with that of Western companies. For ex-
ample, Coty’s packaging sought to preserve an aura of prestige while democratizing perfume 
consumption; Jones, Beauty Imagined, 29–33. 
70 Zhemchuzina, “Dadim Strane Bol’she Myla i Parfi umerii.”
71 James Pilditch, The Silent Salesman: How to Develop Packaging that Sells (London, 
1961).
72 Zemenkov, Grafi ka v bytu; on the socialist objects’ ideological mission, see Kiaer, 
Imagine No Possessions.
73 Sivulka, Stronger than Dirt, 98–106; the phrase “brightening the dark corners of the 
earth” appeared in a Pear’s Soap ad from 1899 and drew from Rudyard Kipling’s poem “The 
White Man’s Burden”; also Jones, Beauty Imagined, 71–93.
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to beautify their drab lives, people used soap wrappers to decorate their 
houses. Hence, artistically sophisticated packaging continued its “cul-
tured work” long after the products’ depletion.74 
Proliferation of product names was the third way to achieve prod-
uct variety. TeZhe’s naming practices followed two patterns. In one, 
TeZhe introduced fragrances named after current events. For example, 
Pobeda Kolkhoza (Victory of Kolkhoz) marked the end of the collectiv-
ization process, Geroĭ Severa (Hero of the North) and Arktika (Arctic) 
honored the Soviet North Pole expedition, and Belomorkanal (White 
Sea Canal) commemorated the canal’s construction. These products 
disappeared once the propagandistic signifi cance of the message had 
eroded. Celebrating the Soviet “Industry of Flowers,” TeZhe also named 
many products after then-domestically cultivated plants—for example, 
Landysh (Lily), Zhasmin (Jasmine), and Lavanda (Lavender).75 Some 
names were temporarily popular; others lasted until the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. 
TeZhe’s rate of new-product introduction indicates marketing 
prowess more than technological capabilities. In some respects, TeZhe’s 
operations appear closer to prerevolutionary artisanal production than 
to the projected vision of a Soviet industrial enterprise.76 While TeZhe 
strived to industrialize production, its packaging often had elaborate 
designs that relied on artisanal skill and knowledge. Such blending of 
manufacturing orientations refl ects TeZhe’s attempts to achieve partly 
incongruent goals: to physically clean the masses and to help develop 
their cultural sensibilities. 
In theory, in the Soviet economy prices were state-controlled, and 
thus could not function as a market segmentation tool. However, recent 
studies suggest that state enterprises such as TeZhe had some discre-
tion in pricing.77 TeZhe offered some products—necessities like basic 
soaps—at state-set prices, others at high, negotiated prices. State-set 
pricing usually meant below cost. TeZhe’s reports continuously empha-
sized commitment to lowering prices and boasted of price reductions.78 
Offering low-priced soaps was consistent with the ideological agenda of 
“cleaning up the masses.” Referred to as narodnoe (people’s) soap, 
basic soaps were widely available and affordable. Although presented 
as a Soviet accomplishment, the idea of narodnoe soap belonged to 
74 “Kak Ukrasit’ Zhilishche,” Rabotnisa 35 (1935): 31, and 15 (1935): 15.
75 Vasil’eva, 100 let Parfi umernoĭ Fabrike, 47–52; Barulina, “Novaia Zaria.” 
76 Vaĭnshteĭn, “Parfi umerno-kosmeticheskaia Promyshlennost’,” 29; “Sovetskaia Parfi -
umerno-kosmeticheskaia Promyshlennost’,” 12; Dubnov, “Obrazets Bol’shevitskoĭ Bor’by.”
77 Gregory and Harrison, “Allocation under Dictatorship.”
78 Otchet o Deiatelnosti Ttresta TeZhe za 1928–29, 27; Dubnov, “Obrazets Bol’shevitskoĭ 
Bor’by”; “Slet Udarnikov TeZhe,” 50–51.
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Henry Brocard.79 In 1865, Brocard introduced “national soap” at one 
kopek per bar to create and capture the bottom end of the market. In 
Russia, similar to the West, factory-produced soap was expensive and 
consumed only by the upper classes.80 In the 1930s, Brocard’s market-
ing formula aligned nicely with the Soviet ideological dictates, except 
the latter did not aim to generate profi ts but instill body-care habits to 
create cultured Soviet citizens. 
TeZhe offered some products at negotiated prices, depending on 
target customers and/or distribution outlets. In the 1930s, such pricing 
was practiced across Soviet industries, as manufacturers were permit-
ted to trade their produce after fi lling the state quotas.81 This was the 
government’s way of stimulating production and subsidizing the costs 
of necessities. Historian Elena Osokina states that negotiated pricing 
served two additional functions.82 First, it aimed to extract money from 
the wealthy to fi nance industrialization. Initially used in Torgsin shops 
that carried luxury goods and targeted customers with foreign currency, 
the policy was extended to state enterprises in 1929. Soon after, TeZhe 
opened its own stores selling high-priced cosmetics. Second, negotiated 
prices addressed the product-shortage problem. High prices limited ac-
cess to certain goods while strengthening the vision of prosperity. Many 
products sat on the shelves like museum artifacts—not really for sale 
but for visual consumption by the masses. With their prohibitive prices, 
these goods functioned to cultivate consumer taste and showcase the 
Soviet economy that never was. 
Visual consumption was indeed the logic behind the exemplary 
shops, which mushroomed in the 1930s Soviet Union. As historian Julie 
Hessler states, exemplary shops were fl agships of the Party’s “cultured 
Soviet trade” policy.83 Modeled after high-end Western retailers, exem-
plary shops were intended to foster culturedness through enhanced 
customer service, qualifi ed personnel, atmosphere, and assortment of 
goods.84 However, the pedagogic role set them apart from capitalist 
models.85 As the Commissar of Domestic Trade stated, the retailer 
79 Barulina, “Novaia Zaria.”
80 Jones, Beauty Imagined. 
81 Osokina, Our Daily Bread, 108–21. 
82 Such price segmentation originated in the postwar “pact” with the Soviet labor aristoc-
racy that gave them access to a middle-class lifestyle in exchange for production effort and 
political loyalty; Vera Dunham, In Stalin’s Time: Middleclass Values in Soviet Fiction (Dur-
ham, N.C., 1990); Osokina, Our Daily Bread.
83 Hessler, Social History, 197–247.
84 Marjorie L. Hilton, “Retailing the Revolution: The State Department Store (GUM) and 
Soviet Society in the 1920s,” Journal of Social History 37 (2004): 939–64; A. Prigarin, “Rab-
ota Obraztsovykh Univermagov,” Sovetskaia Torgovlia 10/11 (1935): 79–88.
85 Amy E. Randall, “Legitimizing Soviet Trade,” Journal of Social History 37 (2004): 
965–90.
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was not simply to serve the customer but to “educate the taste of the 
consumer. . . . Trade workers must create new tastes in the consumer, a 
new Soviet taste and new wares for the consumer.”86 That is, amidst the 
allegedly emergent prosperity, exemplary shops were supposed to shape 
people’s needs to make them into cultured citizens. 
In reality, the Soviet trade’s didactic possibilities were limited. Re-
sources were poured into opening a few luxurious shops instead of ef-
fectively organizing a countrywide retail network.87 Concentrated in 
capital cities, exemplary shops came short of educating the tastes of 
masses; still, they played the important role of showcasing the Soviet 
economy and heralding prosperity.88 As Violet Conolly, an economist 
who traveled in Russia in the 1930s, recalled, TeZhe’s opulently deco-
rated Moscow and Leningrad exemplary shops made material the revo-
lution’s promise of “prosperity for all.”89 The stores sold assortments of 
perfumes, fi ne soaps, and “surprise boxes” (combination sets) at nego-
tiated prices or through reward cards given to Party functionaries and 
Stakhanovites, high-achieving workers.90 Such “staging of luxury” con-
tributed to the illusion of Soviet abundance.91 
TeZhe’s retail network also included specialty shops and stalls; in 
1935, there were 122 specialty shops and 64 stalls across the country.92 
Modest compared to exemplary shops, specialty shops—retail outlets 
for one product category—were nonetheless replete with marketing. Of-
fi cials demanded that managers set layouts and displays according to 
the aesthetic requirements of “socialist construction.” Displays were not 
to entice shoppers but to educate consumers about products and “de-
velop their taste” (vospitat’ i razvit’ vkus).93 Trade journals published 
many articles on store display.94 These articles instructed managers to 
86 Cited in Hessler, Social History, 210.
87 Gronow, Caviar with Champagne, 103.
88 Exemplary shops’ pedagogical role was consistent with the intent of Stalin’s discourse, 
which “consisted of presenting his plans and wishes as accomplished fact”; Victoria Bonnell, 
“The Peasant Woman in Stalinist Political Art of the 1930s,” American Historical Review 98 
(1993): 67.
89 For a description of TeZhe’s exemplary shops see Violet Conolly, Soviet Tempo: A 
Journal of Travel in Russia (Lanham, Md., 1937), 17.
90 M. Iurina, “Kul’tura i Krasota,” Rabotnisa 11 (1936): 17–18; F. Kandiba, “Flakon Duk-
hov,” Ogonek 5 (1936): 19–21; Osokina, Our Daily Bread, 78–81, 154.
91 Conolly, Soviet Tempo.
92 Gronow, Caviar with Champagne, 56; Polina Zhemchuzhina, “Blizhaĭshie Zadachi 
Parfi umernoĭ Promyshlennosti,” MZhD 10 (1936): 465–66.
93 Narkomvnutorg (Ministry of Internal Trade), “Pravila Organizatsii i Soderzhania Ve-
trin,” ratifi ed 3 July 1935; M. Cherkasheninov, “Dekorativno-khudozhesvtennie Raboty v 
Sovetskoĭ Togrovle,” Sovetskaia Torgovlia 4/5 (1936): 143–48.
94 “Vitrina i Obsluzhivanie Pokupatelia,” Sovetskaia Torgovlia 13 (1929): 18; Shkurin, 
“Vitrina Magazina,” OTST 5 (1936): 68–73; I. Tsitron, “Bor’ba za Pokupatelia,” Sovetskaia 
Torgovlia 3 (1936): 58–64; “Obshchee Oformlenie Magazinov,” OTST 4 (1936): 35–51.
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recruit professional artists, who would utilize modern technologies of 
representation such as mechanical prompts, lightning, and photogra-
phy. The instructions represented a Soviet-specifi c marketing logic. 
First, consistent with Karl Marx’s warning regarding alienation, con-
sumer goods should be linked to their production. Thus, displays had to 
represent product origins by depicting the raw materials used and de-
tailing production stages.95 Second, displays should present products in 
their historical trajectory. For example, posters of perfume history 
starting from ancient Greeks would help consumers appreciate a prod-
uct’s functional and aesthetic aspects. Third, displays had to agitate for 
a product, teach how to use it, and “instill it into daily living” (vnedrit’ v 
byt). To this end, display posters should show the product in use.96 
TeZhe shops were repeatedly named among the best in “thoughtful, ar-
tistic organization of windows, displays, and lighting and overall store 
decoration.”97 
TeZhe took the idea of cultural uplifting from vicarious to experien-
tial learning by opening beauty salons (kosmeticheskiĭ kabinet) in de-
partment stores and hotels in cities.98 TeZhe’s beauty salons served 
customers such as “Civil War veterans, young male workers, engineers, 
soldiers, young and old female workers and people from the provinces.”99 
However, they did not treat only those with skin conditions, such as 
war scars and birthmarks, but people wanting to correct defects in ap-
pearance and become more beautiful. For example, one article in the 
weekly Rabotnitsa (Worker Woman) described for potential “patients” 
procedures such as facials, pedicures, and massages. The article con-
veys a sense of a cultural experience that visitors enjoy there: “A patient 
rests in a comfortable chair with a pink kerchief on her head, a pink 
gown on her shoulders and a towel around her neck to prevent spoiling 
her blouse.” As evidence, the article cites the comment from two female 
weaver Stakhanovites: “All was pleasurable in this medical facility that 
attends to skin culture.”100 Overall, while TeZhe’s salons targeted the 
general population, in practice they served predominantly women. 
Furthermore, although constructed as sophisticated medical facilities, 
salons mostly taught people the fundamentals of body care, such as 
washing regularly, brushing teeth, and trimming nails.101 Nonetheless, 
95 This contrasted with the American practice, where “mention[ing] factory life” was re-
garded as deleterious to sales because products shown in a factory conjured up an “unhappy 
familiarity”; Ewen, Captains of Consciousness, 80. 
96 Tsitron, “Bor’ba za Poterbitelia.”
97 Cherkasheninov, “Dekorativno-khudozhesvtennie Raboty v Sovetskoĭ Togrovle.”
98 Iurina, “Kul’tura i Krasota”; Vaĭnshteĭn, “Parfi umerno-kosmeticheskaia promyshlennost.”
99 “Zdorovaia Kozha,” Ogonek [a popular weekly] 10 (1937): 14–15.
100 “V Institute Kosmetiki i Gigieny,” Rabotnitsa 9 (1937): 19.
101 Gronow, Caviar with Champagne.
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repeated representations of beauty salons as a place “between a hair 
salon and a hospital,” staffed with “qualifi ed doctors” and the “latest 
equipment,” served to legitimize the beauty industry as scientifi c and 
useful to society.102 
Similar to Western manufacturers, TeZhe employed mail order and 
traveling salesmen to distribute goods to outlying provinces.103 Al-
though fashioned on the US example, Soviet offi cials regarded mail 
order as more than a modern distribution channel. They saw it both as 
an effective tool to increase product penetration, which would then 
stimulate production, and a way “to increase the cultural and material 
level of the peasant masses.” They instructed state mail-order agencies 
to focus on distributing cultured goods.104 Seeking to qualify its prod-
ucts as “cultured,” TeZhe put together hygiene packs of soaps and tooth 
powder. The trust mailed the packs to agitation clubs and schools to sell 
as supplements to mandatory talks on hygiene.
In contrast to mail order, traveling salesmen, lotochniki, who car-
ried goods in a fl at a shallow box tied to their necks, were regarded as 
an outmoded, “uncultured, Asian method of trade.”105 Moreover, dur-
ing NEP, lotochniki were branded “parasites,” not producing use-value 
but profi ting by “simply” carrying and reselling goods. However, in the 
late 1920s, lotochniki were reinterpreted as “welcomed helpers of the 
industry who assist in liquidating outmoded goods of little demand in 
the cities.”106 Their mission was reframed as “instilling new tastes and 
needs” among peasants by delivering factory-made products such as 
shoes, dresses, and toiletries, which “are necessary for cultural develop-
ment of villages.”107 State trusts such as TeZhe utilized lotochniki as a 
complementary channel to overcome retail defi ciency and increase its 
presence in remote areas. 
Overall, it appears that TeZhe strategically used the branches of the 
retail network as marketing tools to advance its products’ functional 
and ideological roles. Similar to other retailers at the time, through ex-
emplary shops, TeZhe contributed to constructing and showcasing the 
state’s vision of the Soviet economy and the promise of prosperity.108 
102 “Zdorovaia Kozha,” Ogonek 10 (1937): 14–15. 
103 Zhemchuzhina, “Blizhaĭshie Zadachi Parfi umernoĭ Promyshlennosti”; on mail order 
see Boris Emmet and John E. Jeuck, Catalogues and Counters: A History of Sears, Roebuck 
and Company (Chicago, 1950) and for histories of traveling salesmen, see articles in the spe-
cial issue of Business History Review 82 (2008).
104 Il’in-Landsky, “Neobkhodimo Organizovat’ Posyltorg,” Sovetskaia Torgovlia 52 
(1928): 21–22; “Posylochnaia Torgovlia v SSSR,” Sovetskaia Torgovlia 4/5 (1932): 201–7; 
Kantorovich, “Novye Formy Roznichnoĭ Torgovli,” Sovetskaia Torgovlia 9 (1928): 5–7.
105 “O peredvizhnoĭ torgovli,” Sovetskaia Torgovlia 2 (1929): 19.
106 “Raznosnaia i Razvoznaia Torgovlia,” Sovetskaia Torgovlia 34 (1928): 22.
107 “Potrebitel’skiĭ Spros v Derevni,” Sovetskaia Torgovlia 11 (1929): 1.
108 On GUM see Hilton, “Retailing the Revolution”; on univermag see Hessler, Social 
History.
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Under the imperative of developing cultured Soviet citizens, TeZhe 
crafted atmospheres in specialty stores to help educate customers. 
TeZhe beauty salons showed women how to use products, thereby in-
stilling new cultural sensibilities. Through mail order and traveling 
salesmen, TeZhe products united workers and peasants in consumption 
and served as tangible agitators for the proletariat (urban) power. 
By the mid-1930s, TeZhe had reached unprecedented levels of pro-
duction, offered a wide range of products, and established an extensive 
retail network. Although signifi cant, these strategies were not suffi cient 
to fulfi ll the Party’s directive to make cosmetics available to all and 
transform people into cultured Soviet citizens. Thus, TeZhe utilized 
commercial propaganda, a tool that the Soviet authorities conceived as 
effective in helping the masses envision the nation’s (future) prosperity 
and inculcating them into Soviet values. 
In prerevolutionary Russia, as in Western countries, advertising 
was a common marketing tool.109 In the early 1920s, advertising was 
reconceptualized in Russia.110 Russian Constructivists such as Alexan-
der Rodchenko and Vladimir Mayakovsky started to produce agitation-
style posters for state enterprises during NEP.111 They believed that ar-
tistically progressive and technically innovative advertisements would 
help state manufacturers compete with private businesses and promote 
new values. Because advertisements could demonstrate to the illiterate 
population the benefi ts of socialism and serve the state’s objective of 
developing people’s sensory, physical, and mental capacities, Soviet ad-
vertising was deemed a potent weapon against backwardness.112 
Soviet advertising’s goals of informing people about goods and de-
veloping their tastes are evident in different types of TeZhe advertise-
ments. For example, product announcements appeared frequently in 
the government’s daily newspaper, Izvestiia. Crude black-and-white il-
lustrations depicted free-standing TeZhe products tagged with name 
and price. They addressed the reading public in direct revolutionary 
language, encouraging them to demand (trebuĭte!) these TeZhe prod-
ucts. Then there were advertisements portraying happy people using 
TeZhe products. A typical advertisement included a target consumer and 
a tagline praising the product’s functional benefi ts. Visuals commonly 
constituted an oversized representation of a product against the back-
ground of a satisfi ed consumer. Finally, in the late 1930s, the “lifestyle 
109 West, “Material Promised Land.”
110 Snopkov, ed., Advertising Art in Russia, 93.
111 Kiaer, Imagine No Possessions, 143–96.
112 Victoria Bonnell, “The Representation of Women in Early Soviet Political Art,” Russian 
Review 50 (1991): 267; G. Natanson, “Reklama v Usloviiakh Sovetskoĭ Torgovli,” Sovetskaia 
Torgolia 38 (1928): 23; Tsitron, “Bor’ba za Pokupatelia.”
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advertisement” appeared.113 These advertisements represented a soft-
sell approach and generally featured attractive and elegantly dressed 
women. TeZhe products were presented as an emotional part of wom-
en’s fantasies and lives (Figure 1). 
Despite a structural similarity to Western advertisements at the 
time, TeZhe advertisements differed ideologically.114 Soviet advertising 
was not to create false needs, endow a product with hedonistic values, 
or induce consumer desire; rather the social education function of ad-
vertising was to take precedence.115 Advertising had to “advance social 
integration, socialist progress and personal growth for the proletar-
iat.”116 A closer look at TeZhe advertisements reveals how such a role 
was fulfi lled. 
Similar to Western beauty industries, TeZhe’s advertising targeted 
mostly the female population.117 Such a focus was not only due to beau-
ty’s traditional association with women, but also because in the Soviet 
context, women stood for all the politically and culturally backward 
populations.118 TeZhe advertising, along with political art, literature, 
and fi lms, sought to modernize women, transforming them into “civi-
lized Soviet citizens.”119 Towards this end, in the 1930s, TeZhe advertis-
ing presented progressive Soviet female role models. These models 
were represented as either Stakhanovites or obshchestvennitsa (house-
wife-activists), wives of Party functionaries and intelligentsia, educated 
and well-versed in etiquette and culture. The fi rst type was depicted in a 
style reminiscent of 1920s political posters, where women were mascu-
line in their assertive postures and often sported leather jackets and red 
scarves. However, in the 1930s, these images were more feminized: Pic-
tures accentuated female forms and used scarves as a fashion accessory, 
not a political statement. Also, no longer depicted as determined to 
fi ght oppressors, women looked confi dently into the future (Figure 2). 
Historians noted that such feminization did not intend to turn 
women into sex objects but emphasized their reproductive obligation 
to society per Stalinist pronatal policies.120 Through feminized depic-
tions of Soviet women using cosmetics, TeZhe advertisements sought to 
113 Marchand, Advertising the American Dream.
114 Ibid.; see advertisements in Jim Heimann, ed., All-American Ads: 30s (Cologne, 
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transform the bourgeois desire for beauty from a false selfi sh wish into 
a civic obligation. Moreover, featuring Stakhanovites as models, these 
advertisements implied that employment could provide access to goods, 
thereby reminding Soviet women of their opportunity and duty to con-
tribute to the economy as effi cient and productive workers. 
The second type of role models, housewife-activists, were typically 
depicted as Art Deco ladies. An advertisement for the Belaia Noch 
(White Nights) cosmetic set is illustrative. It features a stylish woman 
in a fashionable blue dress and a hat. She sits at a balcony overlooking 
Leningrad’s skyline. With a white fl ower in her hand, she appears to be 
enjoying the bliss of white nights (Figure 1). Though the females in 
these advertisements resembled petit-bourgeois women, they were sup-
posed to represent socially-concerned and ideologically-informed 
housewife-activists, involved in propagating Soviet culturedness. These 
women were to educate workers about hygiene, health, and proper be-
havior and to beautify communal work and leisure spaces, such as cafe-
terias, clubs, and shops.121 The representations of housewife-activists 
Figure 1. Advertisement for “White Night,” 
TeZhe Powder, Perfume, and Cream, Ministry 
of Food Industry, USSR Directorate of Per-
fumery, 1937 (image in the public domain).
Figure 2. Advertisment for “Sanit” tooth-
paste, TeZhe, Ministry of Food Industry, 
USSR Directorate of Perfumery, 1938 (im-
age in the public domain).
121 Hoffmann, Stalinist Values; Reid, “All Stalin’s Women.”
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appeared to emphasize women’s duty to engage in “socially useful labor” 
and to act as societal mothers, parenting not only their own children 
but also the backward populations.122 
Besides presenting female role models, TeZhe advertisements 
sought to promote the new sensibilities. Soviet authorities deemed self-
improvement necessary to achieve the highest levels of productivity and 
collective progress, hence propagated the timely, effi cient, and disci-
plined care of self and home.123 For example, TeZhe advertisements for 
tooth powder reminded people to brush their teeth; posters for shaving 
cream, hair color, and soap presented products as fast and convenient. 
Similar to the West, these advertisements appeared to be selling free 
time to indulge in the emergent consumer culture.124 However, in the 
Soviet context, a person should employ free time to build a healthy body 
and educate oneself in Party policy, culture, and science. To direct peo-
ple to such productive use of free time, TeZhe advertisements often fea-
tured leisure activities, such as going to theaters, having family picnics, 
and enjoying resort holidays. Moreover, these advertisements reinforced 
the idea that holidays had become a workers’ right granted by the so-
cialist system.125 
TeZhe’s key theme of self-improvement appeared in magazines such 
as Rabotnitsa, Krestianka (Peasant Woman), and Ogonek. Didactic in 
style, public-relations articles sought to convince Party offi cials and the 
public that a pleasant appearance was essential for personal develop-
ment. The articles had a common structure: information on TeZhe and 
its products, a how-to section, and a political message, casting beauty 
and body care as both an obligation and a right. Consider the feature ti-
tled “Once Again on Beauty and Culture” in Rabotnisa, carrying an at-
work interview with Zhemchuzhina.126 The text opened with a descrip-
tion of the TeZhe director, depicting her as a petite woman, stylishly 
dressed with well-done hair and manicured nails. Zhemchuzhina started 
her interview by emphasizing that “a woman should always take care of 
herself, her face and body, her nails and skin, and her attire. It doesn’t 
take much time.” She then talked about her own beauty routines, in-
cluding exercise, body conditioning, and facial treatment. Zhemchu-
zhina asserted that body care was not a privilege but could and should 
be performed by all Soviet women, and TeZhe made that possible. 
Zhemchuzhina also discussed establishing the Institute of Beauty 
modeled on “foreign examples”: 
122 Ibid.
123 Kharkhordin, Collective and Individual, 1–34; Simpson, “Parading Myths.”
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Our institute aims to help working women in the matters of health 
and hygiene. There will be professional doctors to diagnose skin 
conditions. Some skin conditions are caused by internal problems; 
thus, the cosmetic consultation might be insuffi cient. Overseas, 
beauty institutes do not care about science, they pursue different 
goals: they are set up by companies to advertise products.127 
Embedded in the discourse of science, medicine, and technology, the 
Soviet beauty institutes were conceived as progressive purveyors of 
beauty. In contrast to foreign examples, which catered to the privileged 
and “charge[d] big money for their beauty secrets,” Soviet beauty insti-
tutes made the secrets “available to all Soviet women.”128 In the spirit of 
sharing beauty tips, Zhemchuzhina concluded the interview with rec-
ommendations to women working in cotton fi elds and rubber factories.
Disseminating beauty and body-care knowledge, an enactment of 
the state’s “beauty for all” ideal, underlined TeZhe’s public relations.129 
TeZhe set up help lines in the beauty salons, where, either in person or 
in writing, women could solicit advice. Similar to advertising, TeZhe’s 
public relations presented beauty as both a right and a duty: 
In the past, burdened by child care, hard labor, and poverty, women 
could not care for themselves. But in our country a woman has an 
opportunity to care for her face, body, and costume. Design ateliers 
create new beautiful dresses. Factories produce new colorful fabrics. 
Trusts enrich shops with goods for body care. An equal participant 
in the building of a new beautiful life, a Soviet woman can and 
should use everything that culture has to offer. A Soviet woman 
must be fresh, healthy, and beautiful.130 
According to Zhemchuzhina, beauty was instrumental for productive 
labor whether a woman was a director, worker, or peasant. Beautiful 
people, she asserted, were part and parcel of the Soviet landscape of 
new beautiful homes, work, and leisure places. Hence, beauty became 
equated with the physical and ideological transformation of the masses 
into cultured Soviet citizens. 
TeZhe also published educational articles for the general public and 
explained the technology and science behind the beauty industry. These 
articles propagated the achievements of the Soviet state and portrayed 
TeZhe as a valuable agent of the country’s industrialization. The texts 
127 Ibid., 17; Zhemchuzhina seems to refer to the US Cleanliness Institute, established in 
1927 by Lever Brothers, Palmolive, and Colgate, among others, to teach the public about 
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extolled TeZhe’s cutting-edge laboratories and machinery, producing 
“rivers of perfume.”131 For example, one article reviewed the history of 
perfume, noting that “perfumes used to be the privilege of the rich class 
of haves,” whereas in the Soviet Union, thanks to TeZhe, they “were 
transformed from luxury to necessity for every cultured person, and be-
came a mass consumer good.”132 Another article, titled “Perfume Bot-
tle,” detailed the intricacies of manufacturing technology. It discussed 
the expeditions of the Soviet scientists who discovered oil-rich plants in 
Crimea, Caucasus, and Central Asia, and the successes of “talented 
chemists who synthesized new artifi cial oils to obtain the best and most 
powerful scents”—so that Soviet women using Soviet fragrances “would 
not envy those women who use Parisian perfumery.”133 
Besides being a public relations exercise for TeZhe, such articles 
served two ideological purposes. First, they presented cosmetics as a 
scientifi cally sophisticated and technologically advanced industry nec-
essary for cultural uplifting. In contrast to perceptions of cosmetics as 
bourgeoisie-oriented artisanal work, these texts talked of the Soviet 
beauty industry as a triumph of medicine, science, and technology over 
nature. Second, they propagated the idea that beauty is an important 
part of personal development, necessary for a productive member of 
Soviet society. The articles presented TeZhe as the key actor in making 
cosmetics widely available, and indeed “a part of the everyday routine 
of every Soviet woman.”134 
Overall, TeZhe’s promotion techniques were similar to those that 
Western beauty companies used at the time.135 However, their logic and 
purposes were different. Soviet commercial propaganda did not aim to 
incite consumer’s desires; instead it sought to educate people about 
products, inculcate modern habits, and stimulate self-growth. TeZhe’s 
communication practices framed consumption of beauty products as a 
social right and duty rather than an individual choice. It emphasized 
the importance of practicing body care for collective progress and the 
betterment of the Soviet nation. While striving to present beauty as 
necessary for all, in practice TeZhe’s communication targeted mostly 
women. In particular, TeZhe sought to contribute to the cultivation of 
women’s culturedness and reiterate their obligation as citizens to pro-
duce and rear new generations of Soviet citizens. Moreover, by high-
lighting the scientifi c nature of the beauty industry, TeZhe presented 
131 Kandiba, “Flakon Dukhov,” 20.
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body care as a daily productive habit of all rather than a hedonistic 
privilege of a few. In reality, due to the raw material shortages and pro-
duction constraints, TeZhe could not provide for the masses. Yet, TeZhe 
continued advertising its products with the primary purpose of project-
ing a vision of Soviet abundance and the cultured life. 
Conclusion
We have examined the operations of an important agent of the early 
Soviet economy. Our study focused on the state trust TeZhe, one of the 
biggest European manufacturers of cosmetics and body-care products 
in the 1930s. Similar to Western companies at the time, TeZhe em-
ployed a variety of marketing techniques.136 In product development 
and diversifi cation, TeZhe heavily relied on tools such as minor product 
modifi cation, packaging, and naming. TeZhe used pricing as a strategic 
instrument. Through low state-set and high negotiated prices, it targeted 
different consumers, thus stimulating consumption of basic hygiene 
products and controlling the demand for premium goods. To achieve 
intensive distribution, TeZhe set up a retail network of exemplary 
shops, specialty shops, and stalls. It also used channels such as beauty 
salons, mail order, and traveling salesmen. To communicate with var-
ious audiences, TeZhe employed diverse styles in advertising and pub-
lic relations, ranging from straight product announcements to lifestyle 
depictions. 
However, despite the structural similarities, the logic of TeZhe’s 
marketing qualitatively differed from that of Western companies. To 
ensure continuous demand, Western businesses implicitly engaged ide-
ology to endow their products with symbolic qualities. In contrast, TeZhe 
used marketing to serve explicitly ideological purposes—to civilize back-
ward populations and transform them into modern Soviet citizens. Te-
Zhe’s marketing sought to physically clean the masses, culturally uplift 
them, and refl ect a vision of an ideal Soviet world. Overtly didactic in 
character, TeZhe’s marketing propagated self-improvement through 
consumption as a path to collective socialist progress. It attempted to 
frame consumption as a productive, progressive social activity rather 
than a hedonistic, bourgeois, individualistic one. For example, artisti-
cally sophisticated packaging, advertisements and displays, along with 
pedagogically oriented beauty salons, promoted personal development. 
They were structured to educate the masses on the fundamentals of 
body care and cultivate their aesthetic sensibilities. Public relations 
136 Nancy Koehn, “Henry Heinz and Brand Creation in the Late Nineteenth Century: Mak-
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articles, which discussed the science of manufacturing and the medici-
nal properties of products, reifi ed body care as a duty and right. Dis-
plays depicting production processes contributed to the construction of 
the Soviet economy as modern and industrialized. Advertising and 
product assortment presented an illusion of choice; negotiated prices 
rendered goods visually if not physically available, while exemplary 
shops embodied excess. Together they served to create a vision of fu-
ture Soviet prosperity. State-set prices and a wide retail network made 
factory-produced soap, once a status good, a consumption staple avail-
able everywhere. Overall, TeZhe’s marketing played its role in “civiliz-
ing” the backward masses and persuading people that life under the so-
cialist regime is “joyous,” fair, and better for all.137 
Though TeZhe sought to clean up and modernize everyone, its mar-
keting efforts were often directed at women alone. For example, to mark 
the emergence of the “Industry of Flowers,” TeZhe named many prod-
ucts after domestically cultivated plants. This led to the proliferation of 
products with fl owery names, conventionally associated with a bour-
geois notion of femininity. TeZhe advertisements aimed to present 
women as models of cultured Soviet citizens, yet ended up featuring 
women as the primary subjects of the civilizing project. Public relations 
articles sought to educate public on hygiene; but they mostly talked 
about body care as a part of being a good wife and mother. Overall, not-
withstanding the efforts to construct the beauty industry as technologi-
cally and culturally progressive, TeZhe’s contribution to the kul’turnost’ 
project was a gendered one. Similar to the Western companies, in many 
respects, TeZhe’s marketing reproduced and reinforced conventional, 
often petit-bourgeois, notions about femininity and gender relations. 
However, TeZhe also promoted unconventional ideas about gender; it 
presented women as productive, wage-earning members of a new soci-
ety. That is, TeZhe’s marketing instructed Soviet women not only to 
maintain a pleasant appearance, but also to participate actively in the 
public sphere and contribute to the building of a modern Soviet state. 
In sum, in the 1930s, marketing was an important part of state trust 
TeZhe’s operations. In the Soviet context, the state trust employed mar-
keting to promote the state’s ideological policies and contribute to the 
construction of the Soviet citizen. TeZhe’s marketing had its own logic 
and worked towards ends beyond commerce. We hope that, by high-
lighting the distinct features of the marketing practices of one state 
trust in the Soviet Union in the 1930s, our inquiry will stimulate further 
research into the workings of other state enterprises and different ac-
tors in the Soviet system and, generally, into histories of marketing in 
non-Western, noncapitalist contexts. 
137 Quoted in Gronow, Caviar with Champagne, 148.
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